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Abstract
The social meanings of play sit at odds with norms of responsible and productive
adult conduct. To be “caught” playing as an adult therefore risks embarrassment.
Still, many designers want to create enjoyable, nonembarrassing play experiences for
adults. To address this need, this article reads instances of spontaneous adult play
through the lens of Erving Goffman’s theory of the interaction order to unpack
conditions and strategies for nonembarrassing adult play. It identifies established
frames, segregated audiences, scripts supporting smooth performance, managing
audience awareness, role distancing, and, particularly, alibis for play: Adults routinely
provide alternative, adult-appropriate motives to account for their play, such as child
care, professional duties, creative expression, or health. Once legitimized, the norms
and rules of play themselves then provide an alibi for behavior that would risk being
embarrassing outside play.
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“Play responsibly.”
–Slogan of many U.S. State Lotteries
Introduction
A common saying has it that “play is the work of the child.” In contemporary
Western societies, play is designated as a thing of children—and children alone.
To our ears, “adult play” is either oxymoron or euphemism. Rarely do we see adults
in the street engage in a bout of free play. And when we do, children or dogs seem
necessarily involved. Why is that?
Across societies, in any given situation, adults are expected to competently and
appropriately enact their social roles. Beyond direct sanctions, they are compelled to
do so by embarrassment, a social emotion that internalizes the imagined devaluation
of one’s self by others over incompetent or inappropriate acts (Goffman, 1967). Now
even in societies less informed by a Protestant work ethic (Weber, 2010), play is
considered the frivolous opposite of adult conduct (Sutton-Smith, 1997). Adults
don’t play, it follows, because play would be role-inappropriate and therefore
embarrassing. Indeed, there is ample evidence that feared embarrassment shies
adults away from playing with toys (Heljakka, 2013), pervasive games and public
installations (Wouters et al., 2016), even interactive museum exhibits (Scott,
Hinton-Smith, Ha¨rma¨, & Broome, 2013).
And yet, from Bingo halls to bowling nights and Adult Fans of Lego, adults do
play, regularly so, and often quite unashamedly. This contradicts the strict juxtapo-
sition of play and adulthood but also raises the question when and how adults are
able to engage in unembarrassed play. This question holds direct value to designers
who wish to reduce embarrassment as a hurdle to engagement or evoke embarrass-
ment in more experimental, aesthetic works (Deterding et al., 2015). While the
literatures on play (Henricks, 2015) and embarrassment (Miller, 1997) are rich and
growing, there is as of yet little connection between the two, therefore little under-
standing of how embarrassment comes about in adult play—and thus, how designers
might intentionally address it. To fill this gap, this article presents a theoretical account
of the relation of adulthood, play, and embarrassment, grounded in Erving Goffman’s
analyses of face-to-face interaction. His work is particularly apt for the task, as it
provides a coherent theoretical framework of both play and embarrassment and is
broadly congruent with current empirical data (Deterding, 2014; Miller, 1997). Like
Goffman’s own accounts (Williams, 1988), the following analysis draws on everyday
data, existing studies, and thought experiments to inform and constrain theory and
illustrate ramifications. It first presents Goffman’s theory of the interaction order and
embarrassment. It then unpacks how the social categories adulthood and play entail
conflicting identity claims. From this, the article derives conditions and issues for
nonembarrassing adult play as well as common techniques of deflecting embarrass-
ment. The conclusion discusses emergent observations and open ends.
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Theoretical Framework
To survive, humans have to maintain the affection, benevolence, and trust of their
conspecifics. The functioning of society in turn depends on people behaving intel-
ligibly and reliably. The interaction order (Goffman, 1983) is the social machinery
that ensures both in everyday life, and social emotions are its fuel (Goffman,
1967). The interaction order captures the social orderings that obtain in
response–present interaction: when two or more people act in mutual reflexive
perception and awareness (Goffman, 1983). Central to it is the “definition of the
situation”: People make sense of actions based on what kind of situation they
believe to be in. This sense-making relies on a shared repertoire of frames, reoc-
curring types of situations such as “going to the doctor” or “lecture” (Goffman,
1986). Framing is the usually taken-for-granted process by which actors constitute
a situation as the instantiation of a specific frame. Frames differ from group to
group and change over time. “Play” and “games” are everyday labels for a family
of frames that share important meanings and norms (such as autotelic enjoyment)
but also differ in many respects (Deterding, 2014).
Every frame entails a set of roles that can (and have to) be taken in by actors and
defines what conduct is expected and appropriate for each role. During socializa-
tion, children internalize the frames and roles of their society—for example, how
to be a proper “guest” when “going to a restaurant.” In the same process, they
become aware of and construct their self from other’s responses to them across
situations, become emotionally invested in this self, and adopt the values of their
group regarding desirable self traits. In short, children start caring about face, “an
image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes” (Goffman, 1967, p.
5). Social emotions such as shame, pride, or embarrassment are the affective
dimension of realizing or imagining how relevant others perceive and evaluate
our self (Scheff, 2000; Turner & Stets, 2006).
Whenever individuals interact, they implicitly or explicitly project certain
identity claims about their self: a competent cook, a kind nurse, or a polite passer-
by (Goffman, 1967, pp. 105–108). These claims are mainly determined by the roles
individuals occupy in a given situational frame (the groom at the wedding), but
identity claims can obtain across situations: One doesn’t stop being (and having
to be) a policeman, a daughter, or a gay rights activist at a wedding.
Whatever the specific roles and frames, the fundamental concern in any encoun-
ter is to maintain each other’s face, chiefly by projecting and regarding valued and
appropriate identities, fulfilling expectations connected to them, and keeping inter-
action flowing smoothly. As a social event, embarrassment occurs when the valued
identity claims participants project in an encounter are somehow disconfirmed
(Goffman, 1967, pp. 97–112). Such disconfirming also disrupts the smooth flow
of interaction: It creates a pause where everyone is torn into self-conscious aware-
ness of the disruption with no ready script how to “move swiftly on,” restore lost face
and get interaction going again. This in turn disconfirms every participant’s basic
Deterding 3
valued identity as a benign and skilled interactant: Adults should “know not to
embarrass each other” and “know what to say.” As an internal process, embarrass-
ment is the sudden self-conscious awareness of such identity-disconfirming events,
together with negative affect and arousal over seeing or imagining others who
disapprove of us as a result. This motivates us to avoid embarrassment-prone situa-
tions and appease after an inappropriate action: blushing, apologies, and making
amends all signal that the embarrassment was unintentional, that we feel bad about
it, and can therefore be trusted to act competently and considerate in the future
(Goffman, 1967, pp. 113–114). All this makes embarrassment an important mechan-
ism of social control.
In sum, embarrassment is overtly an event that publicly discredits active valued
identity claims of participants in an encounter. It discredits identities of the embar-
rassed (e.g., being exposed in a white lie), the embarrasser (being exposed to be so
inconsiderate as to let the truth slip), and possibly, all participants (being exposed as
unskillful interactants not knowing how to get the conversation going again). Cov-
ertly, embarrassment is self-conscious awareness of and negative affect and arousal
over the resultant (feared, imagined, and observed) devaluation of one’s self by
present or imagined others.
The Identity Claims of Adulthood and Play
Goffman’s theory not only initiated sociological and psychological research on
embarrassment: It is still in active use and congruent with current empirical data
(Miller, 1997; Turner & Stets, 2006). Applying it to adult play immediately raises
the question what identity claims are entailed in adulthood and play.
Like many cultural dualisms, adulthood is socially defined in contradistinction to
childhood (Jenkins, 2008, p. 257). Beyond biological maturity, it marks the social
status of being a “full” member of society as a “rational, objective, productive
individual” (Moran, 1979, p. 24). According to contemporary (U.S. American) folk
conceptions, becoming adult means becoming responsible (Arnett, 1998, 2001).
Adults are expected to fully and independently assess the ramifications of their
actions against their own stable values and commitments, and self-regulate their
conduct based on that. Second, adults are expected to be independently dependable.
They should develop the capacity to sustain themselves and a household of (inter)-
dependent partners and children. Third, adults are expected to self-determinedly
comply with social norms, without sanction or reminder. In short, the identity claim
“adult” entails showing stable internal values and commitments; capable self-
governance based on those mindful of others and social norms; and a capacity and
concern for sustaining oneself and one’s dependents (Arnett, 1998, 2001).
How does this sit with the social meanings of play (Heljakka, 2013, pp. 200–235;
Sutton-Smith, 1997)? Where adulthood stands for stable values, personality, and
conduct, play signifies the Protean exploration of possible goals, selves, and beha-
viors. Play submits adult self-governance to arbitrary outer rules and the
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spontaneous flow of events. Adulthood puts responsibility for collective survival
first (via productive work and social care), while play follows the selfish pleasure
principle, an “occasion of pure waste” (Caillois, 2001, p. 55) that temporarily abdi-
cates concerns for instrumental outcomes. Where adulthood means reliable, norm-
abiding conduct, play signifies the immoderate, spontaneous, norm-breaching,
always on the brink of dark play (Linderoth & Mortensen, 2015). Finally, the main
socially acknowledged function of play is to prepare for adulthood (Sutton-Smith,
1997). Hence to be adult is to not be in need of play anymore. All this is not to deny
that there are abundant empirical instances of productive, regulated, and norm-
abiding play. What matters here are the meanings ascribed to play in contemporary
Western societies and, thus, the identity projected by overt acts of play.
Conditions of Legitimate Adult Play
Adulthood and play, then, claim fundamentally divergent identities. When we say
that play is childish, we mean that it is irresponsibly pleasure-driven, unproductive,
and not mindful of social norms. Given this clash, how do we explain unembarrassed
adult play in the wild? If identity-incongruent acts embarrass, play should not
embarrass adults when it is identity-congruent: When to play is to be an adult,
predictable, responsible, productive, norm-minding member of society. For
instance, it is the kindergarten teacher’s adult job to play Patty Cake with children
for their edification; to not do so while on duty would be inappropriate, as would be
playing Patty Cake with adult strangers on a subway for fun. More generally, adult
play should not embarrass when it presents the smooth, unselfconscious perfor-
mance of appropriate identities as part of established social frames and roles. Let
us unpack these conditions.
Established Frames
First, we require an institutionalized frame within a particular social group: For
instance, a shared understanding of “baseball” being “a thing,” and a thing adults
can legitimately engage in. Else, one’s behavior would be unintelligibly (and embar-
rassingly) strange. Beyond basic frames, people can reframe or “key” a given strip of
activity, for example, do something ironically (Goffman, 1986, pp. 43–74). While
play itself may not be appropriate, its keying can be. Gambling is stigmatized, yet an
actor can play a gambler in a theater production unspoilt—if she manages to signal
sufficient difference between role and person.
Frames legitimate play for particular persons in particular roles in particular
situations. Playing on your mobile phone to pass time is fine for a commuter on a
subway but not for a member of parliament during debate (Cresci, 2016). Continuing
biographical identity claims may clash or align with play across multiple situations.
For many, cross-dressing for a role in a school play embarrassingly disconfirms their
valued gender identity.
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One broad family of legitimate adult play frames are professional and social
responsibilities. Parents, teachers, caretakers, therapists, trainers, game journalists
all play in direct service of the well-being and education of others. For them, to play
is to provide. Athletes and actors compete and perform for public edification and
individual gain. Game and toy designers and scholars play to test, improve, and
understand play as a professional subject matter. Such legitimate instrumental key-
ings of play-as-work (Deterding, 2014, pp. 325–377) have also been called “play-to-
order” (Stenros, 2015b, p. 93).
A second family is leisurely recreation. The adult demands of constant self-
regulation, role conformity, and self-provision are socially recognized to be taxing.
To cope, restore, and realize themselves as human beings, adults are allowed
“activity enclaves” (Cohen & Taylor, 1976, p. 97) where they can temporarily cop
out of the other-determined routines of everyday life, lower self-regulation, engage
in hedonic pursuits, and express and explore alternate identities and practices not
fitting their official roles. Common instances are hobbies, games, mass media con-
sumption, travel, or festivals (Cohen & Taylor, 1976, pp. 77–137; Ravenscroft &
Gilchrist, 2009). Mardi Gras is a well-studied example where out-of-character sex-
ual behavior is framed as playful and accepted in public daylight (Redmon, 2003).
Notably, such enclaves aren’t any less socially regulated, only differently. Each of
these “institutionalized escapes . . . has its time and its place” (Cohen & Taylor,
1976, p. 113): They are frames with particular normal (and normative) motives,
settings, objects, roles, scripts, and boundaries. Our escapes from the bounds of
routine and convention are themselves highly bounded, routine, and conventional
(Cohen & Taylor, 1976, p. 97). Like all frames, they come with limits that can be
permissibly framed by them (Goffman, 1986, pp. 49–52, 56). Many consider rep-
resenting the holocaust in a game as inappropriately trivializing (Chapman & Lin-
deroth, 2015). Importantly, adult leisurely play is expected to subordinate to work
and social responsibilities. Leisurely gaming takes place during evenings, weekends,
or holidays, when all other obligations are “done for the day” or in “empty times”
like a subway commute (Deterding, 2014). Two contributions in the present special
issue directly testify to this subordination norm: Group sex events are scheduled in
advance to allow participating parents to arrange babysitters (Harviainen & Frank,
2016, p. 10); board gaming parents fit their hobby into their parental duties by playing
with their children or shifting gameplay to times when the children are in bed (Roger-
son &Gibbs, 2016). Being caught breaking these norms may induce embarrassment or
shame. Failing to even acknowledge their existence harbors a worse fate—being
considered insane (Goffman, 1983a), as the following statement by one of Rogerson
and Gibbs (2016, p. 12) interviewees illustrates: she “felt that her ex-husband’s insis-
tence on continuing to host and participate in game nights despite having a young baby
was a factor in their marriage breakdown. She saw this insistence as a symptom of her
former partner’s mental health problems—‘he just wouldn’t grow up’.”
Different groups share different play frames and valuations of them. What
“official” society considers inappropriate can be appreciated in subcultures and vice
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versa (Copes & Williams, 2007). Emotional distress that “bleeds” into postgame
reality directly violates the norms of contemporary leisurely gaming frames (Deterd-
ing, 2014). And yet, in the Nordic Larp community (Stenros & Montola, 2010, pp.
20–28), which considers live action role-play (larp) a valid artistic medium for
insightful and transformative experiences, larps like Gang Rape are positively val-
ued for their ability to cause such “bleeding” distress (Montola, 2010).
Finally, different forms or genres of play are differently valued for different
persons. Sports and family board gaming are broadly acknowledged as “valuable”
pastime, while gambling carries stigma (King, 1990). Toy play is highly inappropriate
for adults, hence gets hidden or reframed as “collecting” (Heljakka, 2013). Outside
role-playing game communities, adult pretend play has to stay in the imagination,
cued by fictional media or carnival props but not publicly acted out in extenso (Cohen
& Taylor, 1976, p. 77). Even (or particularly) subcultural groups that hold adult play in
high regard—such as fantasy/science fiction fandom and geekdom—maintain finely
tuned and gendered status hierarchies of play genres, with writing commercial fiction
at the top and Furry cosplay at the bottom (Busse, 2013).
Effective Framing
An established frame is necessary but not sufficient for nonembarrassing adult play:
framing a strip of events as an instantiation of such a frame requires necessary
though typically taken-for-granted work and resources. “Baseball” needs to be
practically arranged (bats, gloves, balls, knowledgeable players, the works), but also
signaled. Embarrassment ensues where people engage in misframings (Goffman,
1986, p. 302) such as mistaking a serious remark for a joke, or where framing
remains ambiguous, for in such cases, observer and observed may feel to appear
alternatively thick for “not getting it” or strange for doing something inscrutable.
The more institutionalized and conventionalized a play frame, and the more con-
ventional the materials and actions of the current strip, the more readily their framing.
Novel play forms and unconventional instantiations therefore run higher risks of being
perceived as improper or strange. Explicit framing indicators or “brackets” can reduce
such risk (Goffman, 1986, p. 254). For instance, pervasive games (Montola, Stenros,
& Waern, 2009) occur in public space commonly not used for play and are unknown
to the broader population as a genre. “Festival” in contrast is a well-instituted frame
for temporary extraordinary behavior in public (Ravenscroft & Gilchrist, 2009).
Hence, pervasive games are commonly arranged as part of explicit festivals such as
Playpublik1 that employ brackets like police tape and signposts stating that a festival is
in progress to help passers-by make sense of the unfolding events.
Smooth Performance
By taking on the role of a player, people effectively claim to be reasonably apt ones.
Public performance frames such as sportive or creative contests raise the stakes of
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such skilled performance, as they explicitly invite onlookers to evaluate perfor-
mers by it. Stepping up for a round of Karaoke effectively claims not just basic but
performance-worthy singing skills, which may be one reason many shy away from
it. Taking on a player role also claims basic know-how for the play form in
question—another reason why novel play forms are embarrassment-prone. Imag-
ine a subway conductor suddenly invited to a pervasive game in a subway. A
second ago, she had expert knowledge regarding frame (subway ride) and role
(conductor). Imposing play on her puts herself at risk: torn out of routine and with
no knowledge of the game, exposed to a public that might find her breaking
professional role by joining in. All she is left with is choosing between the embar-
rassment of being a stiff spoilsport and the embarrassment of being a clumsy
novice and neglectful professional.
This also explains why improvisational or “free,” paidic play (Caillois, 2001)
triggers particular embarrassment fears. Games facilitate smooth interaction. At
every turn, a player can fall back on predefined, ready-to-hand goals, rules, and
actions that are immediately intelligible to all thanks to their shared game knowl-
edge. Improvisation offers no such scripts to follow or hide behind, making embar-
rassing gaffes and pauses more likely (Lee, 2009), and every act can be read as direct
expressing one’s personality, desires, and creative capacity. Professional improvi-
sers like rappers therefore train “canned resources” (Lee, 2009) or prepared scripts to
save face and maintain the flow of interaction during inspirational blanks.
Unselfconscious Involvement
Every frame and role hold norms how deeply to be visibly involved in a particular
focus (Goffman, 1967, pp. 114–117). Adults—particularly males and members of
high-risk professions—are expected to maintain a certain “cool” poise and distance
across situations (Goffman, 1967, pp. 214–238). Embarrassment becomes likely
when play becomes so under- or overinvolving that participants can’t hold back
inappropriate involvement expressions (falling asleep and shouting in triumph);
when outsiders peek in on the proceedings, thus actualizing adult role norms of cool
composure; or when uninvolving activity releases awareness into self-conscious
thought about one’s public appearance. The flustering and blushing produced by
this may then cause further embarrassment by disrupting one’s smooth and com-
ported conduct (Goffman, 1967, pp. 101–102). Thankfully, play frames present the
rare case where deep unselfconscious involvement is both socially expected and
afforded by play objects and practices (Deterding, 2015b).
Strategies of Embarrassment Deflection
Even legitimate adult play may provoke embarrassment, be it that structural condi-
tions make it inevitable (Goffman, 1967, pp. 110–113), be it that the tension between
participant identities and the particular play frame and genre is too strong (Goffman,
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1986, p. 274). Straightforward avoidance is a common response (Goffman, 1967, p.
15). Yet sometimes, individuals cannot or don’t want to evade play. Instead, they
will look for strategies to reduce embarrassment (risk), something which profes-
sional play practitioners should be especially aware of and adept at (Lee, 2009).
With no claim to comprehensiveness, four sets of strategies are worth highlighting:
alibis, audience, awareness management, and role distancing.
Alibis
Whether an action disconfirms an identity depends on what meaning people ascribe
to it: Was that elbow buff intentional or accidental? Hence, the accounts people offer
for actions are often as crucial as the actions themselves (Orbuch, 1997). A funda-
mental norm of adult human conduct is to be reasonable. To not appear insane, our
behavior has to be intelligible as guided by reasons, ideally “good” ones (Goffman,
1983a). Whenever others find our behavior questionable, they will likely hold us
accountable: Asking us to provide an account why we did what we did. To maintain
social standing and smooth interaction, we often have reason to give reasons for our
actions different from the actual ones (Mills, 1940). In doing so, we can rely on (and
ought to limit ourselves to) “motivational accounting systems” (Ben-Yehuda, 1990),
the set of reasons accepted as normal for a particular activity.
Adult play presents the interesting case where accounting not just has to render
play reasonable somehow but also in a way that neutralizes its tension with adult
identity. Autotelic enjoyment is widely recognized as the prime motivation of lei-
surely play (Boyle, Connolly, Hainey, & Boyle, 2012). And yet, “pure” autotelic
enjoyment sits at odds with adult identity claims of responsibility, productivity, and
self-regulation. When held accountable for their play, adults are therefore likely to
find themselves in need of an alibi.
In legal and everyday language, an alibi is “a plea by a person accused of an act
that he or she was elsewhere when it took place”; in a weaker and more colloquial
sense, it means “an excuse, pretext, or justification” (OED Online, 2015; Olson &
Wells, 2004). In game scholarship, “alibi” has been used to denote how the rules of a
game and social contract of gaming give a pretext to engage in behaviors that would
be considered inappropriate out of game, such as touching people during a game of
Twister (Montola, 2010; Poremba, 2007; Stenros, 2015a). Grounded in the present
analysis, one can theorize alibi more broadly as a motivational account that deflects
negative inference from displayed behavior to a person’s identity. The account can
be factually true or not, explicit or implicit: What matters is that in the course of
events, it provides effectively implied plausible deniability. The fact that construct-
ing a model train with your child is “quality family time” and “a great gift” deflects
the inference that one might secretly still want to play with model trains.
Irrespective of actual motivations, when adults are faced with an audience that may
find play at odds with their adult identity, they will be prone to account for their play
with such alibis. Gaming consoles are “really” bought because of the in-built DVD
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player (Thornham, 2009). Wargames train valuable cognitive faculties (Dunnigan,
2000). Board gaming facilitates family cohesion (Rogerson & Gibbs, 2016). Role-
playing nurtures creativity, self-development, and social skills (Bowman, 2010). Toys
are smart investments in “collections” that accrue exchange value (Heljakka, 2013).
Playing is good for your health (Brown, 2009). Adult coloring books are “Anti-Stress
Art Therapy for Busy People” (Farrarons, 2015); and so on. Lavenir’s (2015) ethno-
graphy of a French video-gaming workshop for female seniors provides an instructive
example. Among themselves, these women admit and indeed insist that video gaming
is an autotelic pleasure, not a means to a productive end like cognitive training—also
to deflect the stigma that they would be so old as to need training. Yet outside the
workshop, they either hide that they play video games at all, or “when confronted with
someone coming from outside [ . . . ], fall back on a carefully crafted discourse on their
practice and motivations” (Lavenir, 2015, n.p.).
Amateur gamblers peruse opposite alibis for the same reasons: They account for
gambling as inconsequential leisure because the gambling stigma of addiction and
financial folly far outstrips the mild disapproval stirred by “frivolous fun” (Smith &
Preston, 1984). And like professional gamers, professional gamblers neutralize the
stigma of gambling by accounting for it as routine, professional, and gainful labor
(Vines & Linders, 2016).
The same alibi logic operates in the ubiquitous discourses of game designers and
scholars that frame games in terms of their economic import; educational and health
benefits; value as an artistic medium; or potential to drive collaboration, creativity, and
productivity. On the one hand, their profession provides them ready alibis for play. As
the half-joke among game scholars goes: “This is all research.” On the other, having
their professional selves invested in a “frivolous” pastime still exposes them to potential
disapproval in many circles. In stressing the “serious” positive social, economic, and
cultural effects of play, game scholars and designers not only institute new alibis. They
effectively operate asmoral entrepreneurs who normalize and even valorize play—and
with it, their own professional identities (Best, 2003, pp. 38–43). Yet in doing so, they
implicitly reinforce the norm that “just having fun” is not reason enough for adult play,
that play and enjoyment ought to be subservient to productive and social rationales.
A second source of embarrassment-deflecting alibis are keyings. One example
are overt regroundings (Goffman, 1986, p. 74), “the performance of an activity
[ . . . .] for reasons or motives felt to be radically different from those that govern
ordinary actors”. Running through winter streets in speedos is strange; doing so for
charity as part of the “Santa Speedo Run”2 is not (Figure 1). The more excruciating
the embarrassment endured for a “noble” cause, the more positively it reflects on
the person. Another alibi-providing keying are humorous or ironic reversals. An
embarrassment is an unintentional breach of normative expectations that is there-
fore read as a direct, nonfabricated signal of a person’s lacking skill, character, or
goodwill. Conversely, humor is a benign intentional breach of normative expec-
tations (McGraw & Warren, 2010) that is therefore read as fabricated and thus not
revealing of a person’s actual skill, character, or goodwill. If anything, it reveals
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the benign intent of humoring others. Humor entails a risky identity claim itself, of
course—few things are quite as embarrassing as a failing joke—but it is never-
theless a common saving strategy for embarrassment. By following up a faux-pas
with a witty remark that doubles down on it, we invite observers to retrospectively
frame the mishap as part of an intentional attempt at humoring: “It is natural, then,
to find embarrassment and joking together, for both help in denying the same
reality” (Goffman, 1967, p. 112).
Such humorous meaning reversals can also be employed preemptively. If tasked
with an action that is likely to discredit identity claims, people often make a point of
mock performing, artificially exaggerating, or otherwise ironically keying the
action. Afraid of embarrassing themselves at Karaoke, people might choose an
intentionally campy song and sing ostentatiously false and with ostentatiously dra-
matic gestures to clarify that whatever expression they might produce, these are
intended to be entertainingly bad, not due to lacking vocal or bodily grace.
In fact, once we successfully established an alibi for play (“games are
educational”), the play framing itself provides an alibi of play for in-play activities.
The mad-lib rules and offensive cards of Cards Against Humanity “provide[.] per-
mission to tell jokes you don’t dare by removing all sense of responsibility” (Shut Up
& Sit Down, 2015). On a positive note, people often actively seek out and play with
Figure 1. Alibis for play: At the annual Santa Speedo Run, adults run in nothing but speedos
and Santa hats through Boston’s winter to raise money for children. The overt “good cause”
reframes an otherwise embarrassingly strange, even criminal offence into ennobling care for
others. “Santa Speedo Sprint 2008: The Bear Club for Men”# by Tim Schapker, https://
www.flickr.com/photos/albany_tim/3113422672.
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the risk of embarrassing each other, and typically so in a play form like teasing: Few
things are quite as involving as other human beings putting their selves on the line
(Goffman, 1953, pp. 319–327). Jointly embarrassing ourselves nonseriously builds
trust and levels status differences. The nonserious frame of play provides an alibi for
making advances; showing off desirable traits like humility, composure, cool, and
social grace (Goffman, 1967, pp. 214–239); or voicing serious demands and grie-
vances while saving face for everyone (Keltner, Capps, Kring, Young, & Heerey,
2001). To desire or brag or reprimand openly would fully expose everyone to
potential embarrassment; to do so playfully offers the plausible deniability that all
was meant in jest. In practice, alibis for and of play often readily fall together. We
didn’t choose to play Twister, the host suggested it as an icebreaker, and we totally
don’t enjoy being entangled right now, the rules demanded it: We’re having fun
while saving face (Figure 2).
Audience Management
In the course of our lives, we have to claim multiple identities and satisfy multiple
role expectations with often conflicting demands. Likewise, we traverse groups with
different norms. What is normal to our geek friends is strange to our families at
home. Most everyday encounters luckily only demand the performance of select
identities before congruent audiences: a commanding dom at home, a nurturing
teacher at kindergarten (Goffman, 1967, p. 108). However, certain situations
“collapse contexts” (boyd, 2008) and with them, identities and audiences, making
embarrassment unavoidable (Goffman, 1967, pp. 109–113). The birthday party,
Facebook feed, or intercultural business meeting are ready examples. This makes
public play structurally embarrassment-prone. Public spaces expose us to diverse
and usually not fully overseeable audiences, carrying the (perceived) danger of
doing something that breaks the norms of some incidental observer. Audience seg-
regation is therefore a common strategy of deflecting embarrassment (Goffman,
1967, p. 108). It is an elusive obvious fact that adult play typically takes place in
private home spaces where one is literally shielded from the eyes and ears of
potentially disapproving others (Deterding, 2015b). Embarrassing play activities
like Karaoke are staged in dedicated places not transparent to the outside world,
and groups rent individual private cabins within them.
Just like nonembarrassing play needs the absence of disapproving others, so it is
facilitated by present approving ones. The framing of a strip of events as legitimate
play requires response-present others to acknowledge its reality through joint enact-
ment or accepting inattention (“nothing special to see here”). To consider an activity
“normal,” a sufficient number of others has to explicitly or implicitly signal that it is
normal (Goffman, 1972, p. 72). As threshold models of collective behavior like rioting
predict, actors will engage in a behavior once the proportion of perceived others
engaging in it tips the benefits minus costs of engaging over those of not engaging
(Granovetter, 1978; Oliver, 1993). Given enough dancers on the dance floor, the risk
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of being seen wrongly claiming performance-worthy dancing skills becomes smaller
than the risk of being spotted as a spoilsport on the edge (leaving potential enjoyment
benefits of dancing aside for the moment). As individuals may have different thresh-
olds, cascade dynamics become likely. The moment one very low-threshold dancer
“breaks the ice,” their social proof may be enough to tip people with the next higher
thresholds over the edge and so on. This dynamic is recognized as one aspect of the so-
called honeypot effect (Wouters et al., 2016). Other people visibly engaging with a
public interface stimulate passers-by to likewise approach, observe, and engage with
it. Put differently, audience aggregation is another relevant strategy for deflecting
embarrassment. Festivals for instance aggregate a self-selecting group of people into
spatiotemporal response-presence who feature highly approval of and low engage-
ment thresholds for the celebrated play activity. Surrounded by hundreds of other
cosplayers in costume, we feel normal in our faux-troll second skin.
Awareness Management
Physically removing audiences is one way of deflecting their perceived disapproval.
Another is to interrupt the mutual perception between actor and audience: Be it that
the audience is absent in the actor’s awareness, be it that the actor is visibly absent in
the audience’s. The latter is another embarrassment-reducing dynamic of large
Figure 2. Alibis of play: Fulfilling the role expectations of being a considerate player requires
people to play by the rules. The norms of Twister thus temporarily replace the public
interaction norm not to touch strangers. In addition, touching another romantically always
carries the risk of embarrassing rejection. Twister gives an alternative account to deflect this
risk: “the rules made me do it.” “I want to play twister”# Jay Petersen, https://www.flickr.
com/photos/fuzzyjay/2899687311, licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0.
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group play. The more people there are in a street game, the less the individual has to
fear that disapproving eyes fall on her in particular. Dark rooms, costumes, masks,
pseudonyms, and avatars also serve this function. They make actors visible but not
identifiable. During the immersive theater productions of Punchdrunk, I observed
many uninhibited behaviors by mask-wearing audience members. Similarly, con-
cerns for embarrassment recede when individuals become engrossed in an activity.
In personal observation, when adults try out VR gaming for the first time, they first
show high anxious awareness of how silly they must look wearing a headset and
making strange gestures, but as goggles and headphones cut off perception of the
audience and gameplay demands their full attention, this anxiety vanishes, only to
return with shocked realization when they take headset and headphone of and
perceive their (often laughing) audience.
Role Distancing
A final deflection strategy is role distancing, “actions which effectively convey
some disdainful detachment of the performer from a role he is performing” (Goff-
man, 1972, p. 110). Peterson (2011, pp. 145–170) documents a nice instance. When
she asked two young adolescent boys to play the “girl game” The Sims 2, they
immediately managed the identity threat by keying into nonserious, parodist play,
creating the to-them-absurd characters of an overweight, Black homosexual couple.
With smiles, giggles, expletives, gesturing, and mimicking, they constantly signaled
how ridiculous and mock-offensive all this play is.
Conclusions and Elisions
Embarrassment arises when people become aware of imagined or real others per-
ceiving events disconfirming their valued identities. The social meanings of play—
unruly, pleasure-driven, free, and unproductive—disconfirm the valued social iden-
tity of being a self-regulated, norm-abiding, and productive adult. Hence, play risks
embarrassing adults. And yet, there are instances when adults do play unembarras-
sedly. To resolve this paradox, we unpacked conditions and strategies for unembar-
rassed adult play. Unembarrassed play requires an established frame of legitimate
play; we found two families of such frames, professional responsibilities like play-
as-child care and leisurely recreation like hobbies. It requires that valued identities
and situational role expectations don’t clash, which is facilitated by physically
segregating audiences with differing expectations or by enacting distance to a clash-
ing situationally demanded role. It requires clearly framing the given activity as an
instance of a legitimate frame, supported by physical framing signals and aggregat-
ing audiences that mutually signal the normalcy of play by joining in, cheering, or
not minding. It requires smooth performance of role expectations, made easier by
clear scripts, rules, and fallback routines. It requires appropriately deep involvement
in play and lowered self-consciousness of one’s public appearance, aided by
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engrossing activities and masks, pseudonymous avatars, or hiding in a crowd, dis-
rupting the response-presence of others.
Finally, we found that the most obvious motivation for play—autotelic enjoy-
ment—also sits in most direct tension with adult identity. To account for their play,
adults therefore regularly resort to alibis, motivational accounts that deflect negative
inference from their play behavior to their character. Adults account for play as
serving their adult responsibilities: be it that it is part of gainful labor or providing
for others; be it that it nurtures their health and productive faculties; be it that it
serves communal cohesion or artistic expression; or be it that it is re-grounded as
charity or a joke. To play as an adult—legitimately, unembarrassed—is to play
responsibly. As one of the countless guidelines for “responsible gambling” puts it:
“Don’t let gambling interfere with family, friends or work.”3
This observation underlines the general methodological caveat that why people
do things and why they say they do things are often different (Briggs, 2007; Mills,
1940)—a caveat rarely heeded in contemporary research on gameplay motivation
that takes participants’ statements at face value (Boyle et al., 2012, pp. 775–777).
But it also highlights something distinct about play: While we routinely take the
legitimacy of activities like working or studying for granted, adult play today
remains contested and precarious, subservient to productivity norms. Take the fol-
lowing news story on a recent study by three economists. They observed that from
2004 to 2014, a significant and growing portion of noncollege-educated young men
in the United States chose to displace wage labor time with playing video games.
Given a lack of good job opportunities, this choice increased their life satisfaction.
However, far from congratulating the young men on their economically rational
preference maximization, the economists and reporting journalist paint this as a
social problem: “if a historically vibrant portion of the population doesn’t feel as
much desire to work, this could harm the economy’s future and the ability of
government to use policy to create jobs”, or as one quoted economist put it: “That’s
a big chunk of labor that could be used for something, and we’re not using it”
(Swanson, 2016). Labor, historically viewed as divine punishment or the means to
leisure, here is the taken-for-granted end of adult life, while adult leisurely play
remains ever suspicious and in need of justification. The Protestant work ethic seems
alive and well (Weber, 2010).
Maybe for this reason, most frames of legitimate adult play incorporate the full
gamut of conditions, strategies, and alibis. German carnival for instance provides a
well-established festival frame legitimized by tradition, huge play groups and lavish
decoration establishing a clear framing, easy-to-follow scripts reducing required
competence, the alibi of collective obligatory participation and intoxication, and
ample awareness shields (masks, costumes, large crowds, loud music). It also
demonstrates another fact: To not participate in an ongoing encounter of legitimate
adult play is itself an embarrassing norm breach. Those whose persisting biographi-
cal identities clash with the identity of a carnival-goer but feel the social pressure to
participate are easily recognizable by the most severe (and chagrined) acts of mock
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involvement, ironic meta-commentary, and role distancing. Or by leaving town for
the duration.
Similarly, our analysis suggests multiple reasons why games are more suited for
unembarrassed adult play than free play. Games are highly institutionalized and
conventionalized and as such easily signaled and recognized; they come prelegiti-
mized with imputed motives of recreation, family quality time, and so on; they are
designed to be highly absorbing, leaving little mental reserve to become self-
conscious (compared to the many pauses and stops of free play); they are highly
scripted, ensuring smooth interaction and requiring little spontaneous creativity; and
their rules offer established alibis for in-game actions.
Now nothing here is special. The conditions of embarrassment and means of
deflecting it that obtain in adult play obtain for any social frame. If anything, the
boundedness of play lends itself nicely to develop general theories. “Games seem to
display in a simple way the structure of real-life situations” (Goffman, 1972, p. 32).
The present essay is very much an exercise in this spirit.
As a sociological account, it necessarily foregoes individual difference and
change. Psychology tells us that people have different degrees of embarrassability
and that concern for how others perceive us can be unlearned (Miller, 1997).
Furthermore, as a synchronic snapshot of one society, the present analysis is blind
to cultural and historical differences and trajectories. How do “our” norms of legit-
imate adult play compare to those of other cultures and centuries? To what extent are
the “ludification of culture” (Deterding, 2015a), the appearance of “emergent
adulthood” (Arnett, 2007), “cultural neoteny” (Harrison, 2014), or postmodern
“infantilization” (Bernadini, 2014) shifting the grounds of play and adulthood? To
empirically trace the boundaries of embarrassment in adult play is to put such high-
level descriptions of social change to the test. Just as Plato suggested that play
reveals the natural dispositions of an individual, studying “what categories of per-
sons become embarrassed in what recurrent situations” (Goffman, 1967, p. 109) may
tell us much about the state of our societies.
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